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foreword
I t was fortuitous that in November 2004, a colleague introduced me to Craig Linkhorn. Craig was visiting Canberra from New Zealand to attend a conference. I was immediately impressed by his knowledge of, 
and interest in, the Australian native title and land rights scene, especially as he was working at the New 
Zealand Crown Law Office on issues associated with Indigenous peoples’ rights and the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Subsequently, Craig had the opportunity to spend six months in Canberra. I needed no persuasion in agreeing 
to him being appointed as a Visiting Fellow at CAEPR.
Craig was at CAEPR from April to September 2005 and worked on a number of issues including tribal 
governance, commercial uses of inalienable land and other assets, and Indigenous capacity to participate 
meaningfully in consultative processes. During this time we worked closely (with Jennifer Clarke, an ANU-
based law lecturer) in researching and writing the report ‘Land rights and development reform in remote 
Australia’. This report was commissioned by Oxfam Australia during a time when land rights reform was being 
debated in Australia. Craig’s offshore perspectives were invaluable in this research, as were the concrete 
cases from New Zealand that he provided on the financing of housing on Ma-ori-owned land. 
During his time at CAEPR, Craig delivered a seminar in May 2005 on protecting Ma-ori fisheries assets for 
future generations, and a second, ‘Stepping around barriers to financing commercial development involving 
communal land—some New Zealand examples’ in August 2005. This second seminar was also delivered at 
the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination then in the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs.
When Craig needed to return to New Zealand, I encouraged him to write up his second seminar as a CAEPR 
Discussion Paper, which he has now done. The delay in completion has mainly been due to the pressures of 
Craig’s work as Crown Counsel, something that I observed first-hand when I had the pleasure of visiting the 
New Zealand Crown Law Office in May 2006 to give a seminar myself. But it is also due to Craig’s meticulous 
scholarship that has seen him continue to research and update his original seminar with greater access to 
source materials when back ‘home’.
In the meantime in Australia, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 was amended in 
August 2006, ostensibly in part to facilitate greater use of Aboriginal land in townships for business purposes. 
There has been robust debate in Australia about whether the new law will help, or hinder, more business and 
greater access to development finance in Aboriginal townships. Under these circumstances, it is important, 
I think, to have offshore perspectives on similar issues and the New Zealand material and thoughtful policy 
pointers provided by Craig are welcome. I thank Craig for his efforts and am hopeful that our collaborations 
will continue in future.
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
October 2006
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ABStrAct
This paper examines issues connected with the availability of finance to develop Ma-ori land and the use of 
Ma-ori land as security for loans, using two case studies. The paper concludes with some remarks about the 
New Zealand situation that might be relevant and of interest to those working with Indigenous landowning 
communities in Australia.
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introdUction
Ma
-ori land is widely perceived as unacceptable to financial institutions as security for a loan for business 
purposes. This view is fed in part by the inaccurate perception that Ma-ori land is not available to 
lenders as a remedy if debt secured by that land is defaulted on. The true barriers to use of Ma-ori land for 
new business developments are more probably practical business issues rather than legal barriers. These 
include the strength of the business proposal and the strength of the proposed Ma-ori business partner, as 
well as the understandings held by financial institutions of this segment of the business market. This market 
segment might simply be insufficiently attractive to major private-sector financial institutions to justify 
extra effort in the face of easier business prospects elsewhere.
The paper takes the following route. Some key characteristics about Ma-ori land are outlined and some 
background information is set out on Ma-ori land development. The current legal context is then examined 
and some features of the business and practical context are discussed. Two case studies provide recent 
examples of development initiatives using Ma-ori land. The conclusion provides some remarks about New 
Zealand experience that might be relevant and of interest to Indigenous communities in Australia.
MA
-
ori lAnd todAY 
wHAt iS MA
-
ori lAnd?
It is important to be precise about the ‘Ma-ori land’ at issue in this paper. Doing so further focuses the paper 
on under-developed Ma-ori land, rather than a more general focus on Ma-ori owners of land within both the 
general land and Ma-ori land systems used in New Zealand. For the purposes of this paper ‘Ma-ori land’ is a 
statutory category of land called Ma-ori freehold land.1 Ma-ori freehold land is land held and managed under 
Te Ture Whenua Ma-ori/Ma-ori Land Act 1993 (‘the 1993 Act’). It is private land, not public land. The land 
may be owned directly by individuals, beneficially via trustees, or by a corporation2 representing individual 
owners who hold shares in the corporation.3
However, much land presently owned by Ma-ori is not Ma-ori freehold land. There are two general patterns to 
this. The first is that many Ma-ori people now reside away from their traditional tribal areas. The 2001 Census 
records that 86 per cent of Ma-ori live in urban areas.4 While some of those people will have tribal links to 
those urban areas, probably most Ma-ori residents of the bigger cities and major regional centres will not. 
The residential property owned by Ma-ori in urban environments is unlikely to be held as Ma-ori land, and is 
much more likely to be held as general land. This is the dominant land tenure in New Zealand, which operates 
under a Torrens system of registration and land transfer. 
Secondly, there appears to be an increasing tendency for Ma-ori enterprise (tribal and personal) removing or 
keeping land outside the Ma-ori land system. Such land is held under the general land system. Most notable 
2 linKHorn 
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here are the decisions by tribal groups to not have the Ma-ori Land Court jurisdiction and Ma-ori land system 
apply to all assets transferred to them by recent Treaty of Waitangi settlements negotiated with the Crown.5 
At another level are decisions taken by Ma-ori-owned businesses to take land out of the Ma-ori land system 
or to acquire general land and not make it subject to the Ma-ori land system.6 This paper does not address 
Ma-ori-owned land held outside the Ma-ori land system.
tHe MA
-
ori lAnd lAw SYSteM
The ‘Ma-ori land’ system has particular origins in policies about how people who came to New Zealand 
after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 would obtain rights to land, given that it was accepted 
reasonably early on in the colony that all land in New Zealand was owned by Ma-ori (Ward 1999: 75). Initially 
these policies favoured large-scale acquisitions of land by the Crown direct from Ma-ori owners. The vast 
majority of the land in the South Island was acquired by the Crown in this way through a series of large 
purchases, before being made available to settlers. Since 1865, a title determination process has generally 
preceded legally effective private dealings in land interests owned by Ma-ori. Under this system, ownership 
of the majority of the remaining Ma-ori land base has been determined over time by the Ma-ori Land Court 
(previously styled the Native Land Court). Land blocks were brought before the Court, or an equivalent title 
investigation process, to determine who had ownership rights. Claims of ownership were advanced before 
the Court on the basis of arguments about the strength of customary entitlements to control use of the land 
in issue. In simple terms, the outcome was that a group of confirmed owners was listed and awarded a title 
to the land to enable them to deal with that land. 
Under this legislated system, ownership of Ma-ori land was usually divided into shareholdings or held in 
common by those individuals confirmed as owners. In this sense, most Ma-ori land, even where it has multiple 
owners, has been individualised by this process.
This title determination process, summarised above in simplified terms, has attracted a great deal of criticism 
over time. It was seen as an attempt to integrate both Ma-ori and western legal norms about land rights. It is 
now generally accepted that until the Ma-ori Affairs Act 1953 and the 1993 Act that replaced it, the balance 
set by legislation and judicial interpretation underemphasised Ma-ori legal norms about community rights in 
land and overemphasised rights that were created for individuals to divide their interests from the remaining 
community of owners, in some periods without reference to that community. The system engaged selectively 
with Ma-ori customary norms about land tenure. The statutory schemes that resulted are considered by some 
to be a considerable distortion of custom rather than innovations consistent with a changing society (e.g. 
Kawharu 1977: 15 identifies the Native Land Court (now Ma-ori Land Court) as an engine of destruction of 
tribal land tenure; see also McHugh 2004: 265–66; Ward 1999: Chapter 8). Since the 1993 Act came into 
operation there is now a greater emphasis on retention of Ma-ori land for the benefit of its owners and tribal 
communities. The 1993 Act reflects in many respects a coming to terms with the fact that collectively owned 
Ma-ori land is a legitimate ongoing form of tenure.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
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PROFILE OF THE REMAINING MA
-
ORI LAND BASE
Of the Ma-ori land retained in Ma-ori ownership, succession over time to the legal interests of deceased owners 
has led to proliferation of owners for many properties. In broad terms, unless altered by will, succession has 
generally been applied by the Ma-ori Land Court as entitling all children to an equal share in their parent’s 
estate. As well as successions swelling the numbers of owners, until the 1993 Act came into operation 
Ma-ori land blocks were regularly partitioned as members of communities of owners decided to split their 
land interests. In many cases this led to uneconomic or impracticable land holdings in spite of the good 
intentions often behind such proposals, which were regularly directed at a sub-group of owners getting 
control of an area of the original block. Table 1 illustrates broadly how Ma-ori land left Ma-ori ownership 
through large-scale purchases and confiscation, so that today Ma-ori own just 6 per cent of New Zealand.
Proliferation of owners and excessive partitioning has latterly led to moves to encourage extended family 
groups and tribal groups to vest individual land holdings in trust for the benefit of the group.7 Trustees are 
usually drawn from members of the group. Acting in a representative capacity the trustees can engage with 
outside interests on behalf of all who are beneficially entitled and coordinate the interests of the beneficiary 
group. This lowers administrative costs and avoids the need for each new generation to succeed as individual 
owners to their forbears’ land titles. Existing land titles may be aggregated under the 1993 Act for more 
efficient management. Where this occurs, ownership interests may also be aggregated so that the land is 
vested in trustees for the benefit of a tribal group rather than individually owned. 
Acquisition of Ma-ori land North Island South Island New Zealand
Square 
kilometres %
Square 
kilometres %
Square 
kilometres %
Purchases to 1865 21,500 18.9 152,500 99.7 174,000 65
Confiscation 14,000 12.3 0 14,000  5
Purchases from 1865 64,000 56.1 0 64,000  24
Land retained 14,500  12.7 500  0.3 15,000  6
Total land 114,000 153,000 267,000
Table 1. How Ma-ori land left Ma-ori ownership
Source: Adapted from Controller & Auditor General 2004: 26–7. 
Note: The 2004 source is an approximation reliant upon a number of sources (Te Puni Ko-kiri, Land Information New Zealand and 
the New Zealand Historical Atlas, plates 39 and 41).
4 linKHorn 
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Ma-ori incorporations are corporate vehicles used for a reasonable amount of actively managed Ma-ori land. 
Land is controlled by the incorporation as a trustee. The incorporation’s shareholders are deemed to own the 
land controlled by the incorporation in proportion to their shareholdings. The incorporation is accountable to 
its shareholders in much the same way a limited liability company is. It has office holders and a constitution 
as well as a share register. Ma-ori incorporations are essentially vehicles for collective commercial endeavour 
by owners of Ma-ori land.
Despite the availability of these tools to ameliorate the impact of earlier policies on the remaining Ma-ori 
land base, the administrative state of Ma-ori land titles continues to hinder utilisation and development by 
many landowners. It also indicates a legacy of high transaction costs affecting this land. In a recent report 
on Ma-ori land administration the New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General highlighted the challenges 
facing Ma-ori landowners and executive government (Controller & Auditor-General 2004). Ma-ori land today 
comprises about 15,000 square kilometres (1.5 million hectares) or 6 per cent of New Zealand’s total land 
area; however, the ownership of that land is divided into more than 2.3 million interests (Controller & 
Auditor-General 2004). This is said to be comparable to the total number of ownership interests for the 
remaining 94 per cent of New Zealand’s land area. The number of owners for blocks varies with 10 per cent 
of blocks being vested in a single owner (possibly representative) through to 10 per cent with an average 
of 425 owners each. The overall average is 62 owners per title. Ownership interests in land block shares are 
recorded to eight decimal places in some instances because the shares are so fragmented through successions 
(Controller & Auditor-General 2004).
Aside from issues of capital assets retained, development finance and financial and governance capacity 
of owners discussed further below, development and utilisation is further impeded by both the geography 
of much of the remaining Ma-ori land base as well as incomplete information about that land. Incomplete 
information means there is less certainty, and thus higher risks, for people wanting to deal in such land. This 
contributes to higher transaction costs for development proposals.
Of remaining Ma-ori land, 80 per cent is in remote areas or the poorest land classes.8 Nearly 50 per cent of 
Ma-ori land blocks have not been surveyed. A 2004 report identified that nearly 58 per cent of Ma-ori land 
blocks have not had Ma-ori Land Court ownership orders registered under the Land Transfer Act 1952, the 
main statutory vehicle supporting Torrens title in New Zealand. A number of transactions affecting such land 
that require registration cannot proceed until, for example, the land is surveyed and its record of ownership 
is registered under the Land Transfer Act 1952 (Controller & Auditor-General 2004).9 A major project is 
underway to improve the currency of ownership records and land parcel records for Ma-ori land. It aims to 
provide all owners of Ma-ori freehold land with a registered title at no cost to those owners.10
The largest areas of remaining Ma-ori land are in the North Island, especially in the centre of that island 
and in the east coast region (Te Puni Ko-kiri 1996 cited in Kingi 2004: 7 and Table 1). Available data on 
organisational administration of this land is from 1996 (Te Puni Ko-kiri 1996 cited in Kingi 2004: Table 
2). The position will be changed now, in that the land area without any administrative structure will 
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probably be reduced, but this available data indicated that of the approximately 15,000 square kilometres 
(1,515,071 hectares) of Ma-ori land:
•	 Ma-ori incorporations administered 13.7 per cent (207,156ha)
•	 Ahu Whenua (Land Development) Trusts administered 49.5 per cent (750,187ha)
•	 No administrative structure existed for 19.4 per cent (293,886ha)11
•	 A residue of at least five minor categories accounted for the remaining 17.4 per cent (263,852ha)
An ongoing concern about Ma-ori land is that too much of it is under-developed and consequently under-
utilised for the benefit of its owners. Absence of structures for land administration where there are more 
than a few owners is a strong indicator that land might be under-utilised for the benefit of its owners.
BAcKGroUnd—MA
-
ori lAnd developMent
Having set out some information about the current state of Ma-ori land and its utilisation, it is important to 
include some background information on Ma-ori land development over time to contextualise the current 
situation. 
lAnd ricH, cASH poor
What were Ma-ori communities to do in the nineteenth century if they were comparatively ‘rich’ in land but 
possessed little cash to develop that land, so as to participate in the new ‘market’ economy dominated by 
pastoral farming? It should be said at once that many colonists had their own ideas about what Ma-ori should 
do with their land. The prospect of a rentier class of Ma-ori leasing land to settler farmers was unattractive 
and contradicted core settler values opposed to landlordism. It was argued that people had not left the 
United Kingdom in order to come to the other side of the world in order to replicate social structures they 
had gladly left behind in search of a better life (Hawke 2002: 16–18). Others assumed that most Ma-ori would 
be a rural labouring class, perhaps with small plots of land for their own support and to supplement seasonal 
work. It was thought some tribal leaders would make a transition to be gentlemen farmers. Many settlers did 
not need to reason through how Ma-ori would (socially) control ownership of their land or what Ma-ori would 
do with their remaining land. A first-order consensus viewpoint was that Ma-ori owned more land than they 
needed and that the overall progress of the colony would depend on Ma-ori selling that land so that waves 
of settlers could maximise its productive use. This was a constant theme in Ma-ori land politics in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and, perhaps, even as late as 1920.
Understandably, many Ma-ori communities did not see themselves this way. Their struggle was to break into 
the new economy and the advantages brought by the settlers without paying too heavy a price from their 
cultural or capital wealth. The overall evaluation by many historians and by the Waitangi Tribunal of the land 
transactions struck in pursuit of these twin goals is that Ma-ori fared poorly on the whole (e.g. see Waitangi 
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Tribunal 2004a, 2004b, 2006 for the Tribunal’s evaluation and the expert historical evidence relied upon). 
New Zealand society is now engaged in a complex process to evaluate that past experience, acknowledge the 
mistakes made and to build a better platform for the future. At present a central theme in that exercise of 
claims and negotiated settlements is to try to appreciate the extent to which the statutory Ma-ori land law 
system worked against, rather than in support of, Ma-ori goals.
tHe StAtUtorY MA
-
ori lAnd lAw SYSteM
Statute-based ‘Ma-ori land law’ is a complex body of law, not least because of its frequent amendment by 
Parliament. It is too complex to survey here. Instead I outline some basic features of its operation relevant 
to enterprise development issues.
Aside from subsistence living or self-financed primary production from land, engagement with the wider 
marketplace for land generally turned on Ma-ori having secure title to the land. After 1865 the land title 
determination processes of the Ma-ori Land Court could offer this. But the Crown-derived titles that resulted 
came at a price. The cost involved was borne by the communities with customary interests in the land. The 
title determination process was a ‘winner takes all’ affair. Those individuals named as owners by the process 
were the only persons outsiders had to bargain with. Although it is a simplification across a long period 
of time where the law was changed frequently, in general, people with customary interests who were not 
named as owners had no legally enforceable interest in the land. If this was the first part of the price paid by 
communities, the second part was the challenge in persuading individual owners of the newly determined 
land titles to continue to act as a group.
The land title determination system was intended to be transformative of Ma-ori customary land. The system 
assumed Ma-ori would bring their land before the Native Land Court (or equivalent process) to be processed 
from a communal to an individualised form of title. At this point it might be retained or it might be sold.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the majority of the rules governing dealings in land—the 
title to which had been determined by the Ma-ori Land Court—did not actively encourage or facilitate 
collective decision-making about land use and development by the community of owners (Waitangi Tribunal 
2004b: 513–7). By and large, if a community of owners continued to act collectively that was their own 
achievement. 
This point has been made strongly by the Waitangi Tribunal in its report on claims in the Turanganui-a-Kiwa/
Gisborne region of the East Coast of the North Island. The Waitangi Tribunal emphasised that communities 
of owners did not have effective legal control as a group over the process of selling land—that was largely 
a matter between an individual seller and the purchaser. By selling individual interests serially, the sellers did 
not receive money for their land in such amounts as to encourage it to be preserved from consumption for 
future investment. Instead, it appears that sale proceeds were regularly dissipated. The prices commanded 
by individual interests often seem to have been devoted to short term consumption or the purchase of 
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useful but depreciating assets. It is also worth pointing out that the uncertainties associated with buying 
an individual’s fractional, and often undefined, interests in land blocks meant sellers could not command a 
premium price for their interest unless it was one of the last remaining Ma-ori interests in a land block.12 The 
Tribunal’s conclusions included the following assessment:
The whole idea of individualised purchase, the complexity and contradiction of the legal regime and the 
cost of the process and subsistence prices were, together, capable of producing only landlessness and 
poverty (Waitangi Tribunal 2004b 8.5.9: 521).
leverAGinG developMent opportUnitieS froM A lAnd BASe
How did Ma-ori leverage development opportunities from their land assets in the colonial and Dominion 
periods?
Most obviously, Ma-ori sold land in large blocks to the Crown so that settlers would come to that land and 
economic opportunities would increase in reasonable proximity to where the sellers retained land. In this 
way sellers hoped to receive benefits from towns and infrastructure being developed in proximity to their 
communities. Related to this were land sales of smaller blocks in a piecemeal fashion that would generate 
cash to pay for the development of other land and the acquisition of needed equipment (e.g. stocking 
and fencing retained land and purchasing horses). Leasing land to pastoralists or the Crown was a third 
option. Leasing land secured an income stream for the landowners, although it did not necessarily provide 
an income stream large enough to exceed short-term spending and thereby save a surplus that might be 
used to develop other land. Further, lessees, including the Crown, appear to have regularly used leasing as a 
relationship-building exercise and as a precursor to later purchases. Finally there was the direct use of land 
by its owners for cropping, farming or resource extraction (e.g. flax, timber) in order to trade this produce 
for money or valuable equipment.13
Mortgaging Ma-ori land to leverage development opportunities was not a widespread activity. Indeed there 
were significant restrictions on the ability to mortgage Ma-ori land for considerable periods through to 1909 
(Hayes 2001: section VIII). Hawke (2002) has observed that these restrictions inhibited Ma-ori landowners’ 
access to finance by reducing their ability to assure lenders that in the event of default the principal could 
be recovered through taking possession of the land.
It now seems obvious that when land assets were not leveraged collectively by a community of owners there 
might be very little to show for land sales within a short time—as a group or as individual owners. This is 
because of the sheer dissipating force of spreading money around all those with ownership interests rather 
than preserving it as a transformed and pooled form of development capital. Strategic sales of some land by 
Ma-ori in order to develop their remaining land were not the way things turned out for many communities. 
Where group rights, in Ma-ori cultural terms, were not supported by the policies underpinning statutory 
Ma-ori land law, the norms on which these rights were based appear to have struggled to remain compelling 
for participants in the face of the newer individualised ways of dealing in land. Given the undoubted 
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strength of Ma-ori culture throughout this period, this is significant and appears paradoxical. The complexity 
appears to be in unpacking the relations between individuals and groups, including the leaders of groups. 
The question boils down to asking why did individual Ma-ori sell land so readily?
A number of Ma-ori leaders and politicians recognised that many communities appeared to be on the road to 
landlessness unless policy settings changed. For some communities this recognition was too late. Even with 
changes in attitude in the twentieth century, it took some time to include policy settings that more readily 
facilitated development of the remaining Ma-ori land base. With much of the best land sold, that remaining 
land base frequently consisted of hard-to-use rural land.
After a significant absence from institutional architecture, near the end of the nineteenth century Ma-ori 
desires to manage land at a community level were accepted to some extent. From 1894 Ma-ori obtained 
the right to have land managed as a joint asset through the owners forming an incorporation. Ma-ori 
Incorporations have subsequently become a powerful force for commercial activity on Ma-ori-owned land. 
Both the case studies in this paper are about Ma-ori Incorporations.
Finance from pooled Ma-ori monies administered by the state, statutory trustees or direct from state sources 
for Ma-ori land development in the first third of the twentieth century could not meet the demand for 
development money. This demand gap did not generate a solid private-sector segment of the market. 
Rather, at the start of the twentieth century it appears many owners of Ma-ori freehold land had their 
business experience mediated through state agencies such as Ma-ori Land Boards or appointed commissioners 
operating under legislated rescue regimes.14 A further category of owners were relegated to the passive 
position of being lessors in perpetuity of land subject to regulated rents based on the unimproved value of 
the land. Consequently there was less direct experience of ‘being in business’ than might be assumed.
This unmet demand for development finance exercised the member of the General Assembly for Eastern 
Ma-ori, Sir Apirana Ngata. He devoted considerable energy to improving the prospects of Ma-ori farmers and 
Ma-ori rural communities. He was well qualified to do this from his experience in public office and his work 
with his own people. In 1929, as Native Minister, Ngata was in a position to greatly accelerate rural Ma-ori 
land development by successfully promoting through Parliament a scheme to develop Ma-ori-owned land 
into farms using the state as a facilitator of finance (Ngata 1931). The legislation for these development 
schemes was promoted alongside a scheme to develop Crown-owned land for settlement by farmers. 
The resulting Ma-ori land development schemes are a story in their own right, beyond the scope of this 
paper. The schemes grew bigger than Ngata’s original vision of a circuit-breaking response to development 
barriers. They became institutionalised and remained a viable mechanism to develop under-developed Ma-ori 
land for more intensive economic use until the mid-1980s. Many North Island regions saw land developed 
into farming (and some horticultural) enterprises this way for the benefit of Ma-ori landowners. Following 
economic reform in New Zealand dating from 1984, state involvement in private Ma-ori land development 
has been curtailed. In general terms Ma-ori landowners must now engage with the private sector in their 
plans to develop under-developed Ma-ori land.
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THE CURRENT LEGAL CONTExT: TE TURE WHENUA MA-ORI/MA-ORI LAND ACT 
13
This paper is focused on the statutory category of Ma-ori freehold land governed by the 1993 Act. As indicated 
earlier, Ma-ori-owned enterprises can decide to apply to the Ma-ori Land Court to remove land from this land-
holding system. Equally, decisions are made about whether to place newly acquired land within this more 
restrictive system, or to retain it as general land. Where Ma-ori own land in the general land transfer system, 
it can be traded and offered as security without the restrictions discussed below applying.
DEALINGS IN LAND CONTROLLED BY THE 13 ACT
The 1993 Act strictly controls many dealings in Ma-ori land by owners and trustees defined as alienations 
(s.146). The term ‘alienation’ is defined widely (s.4) and includes: transfers of interests in Ma-ori land; leases 
and licences, easements, profits, mortgages, charges, encumbrances and trusts made in respect of Ma-ori 
land; forestry rights over Ma-ori land; arrangements to dispose of Ma-ori land; arrangements to succeed to 
Ma-ori land on the death of any owner; and agreements that Ma-ori land be taken for public works.15
THE POSITION OF MORTGAGEES
There are thus few dealings in land not caught by the definition of alienation under the 1993 Act. An 
important exception is that the exercise of a mortgagee’s power of sale is not counted as a fresh alienation.16 
The alienation that counts in this situation is the granting of the mortgage. While the land remains 
encumbered by a mortgage it is at risk of sale on default by the mortgagor landowner.
This exception to the controls on alienating Ma-ori land may not be well appreciated. Popular assumptions 
circulate that Ma-ori land cannot be offered as security for a loan or, if it can be, the lender cannot recover 
on default. It seems to be regularly assumed that a key barrier to a lender recovering their interests—by 
selling mortgaged land when the borrower is in default—is the general obligation that before Ma-ori land 
can be sold on the open market it must be first offered to a preferred class of alienees comprising the kin of 
the sellers. This is not so.
ALIENATING MA
-
ORI FREEHOLD LAND
The 1993 Act governs ‘alienations’ of Ma-ori freehold land using thresholds and rights of first refusal to approve 
alienations by groups of owners. Permanent and longer-term alienations are independently scrutinised by 
the Ma-ori Land Court system. The core of the process is summarised here.
A sole owner can alienate his or her Ma-ori freehold land block. Joint tenant owners acting together can 
alienate Ma-ori freehold land. Owners in common17 or trustee owners18 can alienate Ma-ori freehold land in 
the following ways: by sale or gift if owners of at least 75 per cent of beneficial interests in the land consent 
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(where interests are defined) or three-quarters of owners consent (for undefined interests); by long-term 
lease19 if the Court approves and the proposed lease has consent of at least 50 per cent of beneficial interests 
in the land (where interests are defined) or half of the owners (for undefined interests); in any other way by 
owners in common if all owners consent or a resolution is passed at a meeting of assembled owners.
A Ma-ori Incorporation can alienate Ma-ori freehold land vested in it by sale or gift if shareholders holding 
at least 75 per cent of the total shares in the incorporation approve;20 or by long-term lease if the Court 
approves and the proposed lease is authorised by a resolution of shareholders who hold 50 per cent or more 
of the total shares in the incorporation.
Finally, a person with a life interest in Ma-ori freehold land cannot alienate that land unless he or she has 
obtained the consent of all people entitled to the land at the end of that life interest (i.e. those entitled in 
remainder). While the person holds the life interest they are obliged to act as a kaitiaki or guardian of the 
land in accordance with Ma-ori customary values and practices (tikanga Ma-ori) (s.150D).
riGHt of firSt refUSAl owed to preferred clASSeS of AlieneeS
A member of one of the two preferred class of alienees in the 1993 Act has a statutory right of first refusal to 
acquire an interest in Ma-ori land before it can be offered for sale or as a gift to people beyond the preferred 
class (defined in s.4). Only these two types of alienation attract this obligation. This system is designed to 
assist Ma-ori to retain Ma-ori land in Ma-ori ownership within a kinship framework. The first preferred class 
comprises: children and remoter issue of the alienor; wha-naunga (relations) of the alienor associated with 
the land under tikanga Ma-ori; other beneficial owners who are members of the hapu- associated with the 
land; trustees for these first three sub-classes above; and, descendants of any former owner who is or was 
associated with the land.21 The second preferred class relates to the sale of shares in a Ma-ori Incorporation 
and comprises the same persons represented in the first class with the addition of the Ma-ori Incorporation 
itself, if no one else from another sub-class wishes to purchase the interest that is for sale.
role of tHe MA
-
ori lAnd coUrt in confirMinG AlienAtionS
The Ma-ori Land Court has a role to confirm independently that alienations of Ma-ori freehold land are in 
order.22 This is a protective jurisdiction. Sales or gifts of land require confirmation from the Court. Lesser 
alienations require a certificate of confirmation or notation from the Registrar of the Court.23 The sale of 
undivided interests separately or in small groups has in the past been a significant source of grievance 
about Ma-ori land law. This is now prohibited.24 Whilst an undivided interest in Ma-ori freehold land can be 
mortgaged to a State loan department (Housing New Zealand Corporation, the Public Trust or the Ma-ori 
Trust Office (s.4)), that land cannot be alienated separately except to a member of the preferred class of 
alienees (s.148). Further, even that limited permissible alienation of land requires confirmation by the Court 
(s.150) (by vesting order, or transfer by memorandum between the parties). 
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The Court must grant confirmation of an alienation if the documentation is in order within given timeframes, 
or the resolution of assembled owners meets set standards, the alienation would not breach any trust the 
land is subject to, the consideration payable is judged adequate25 and takes proper account of asset values, 
the purchase money has been paid or is appropriately secured (this is regulated for many transactions 
(s.159)), and, any obligation to offer a right of first refusal to the preferred classes of alienees has been 
discharged (s.152(1)). Until confirmation is obtained from the Court the transaction at issue is of no effect 
(s.156(1)).26 Evidence of the Court’s confirmation is provided by a certificate or court order (s.155). The Court 
can vary the terms of the alienation, with the parties’ consent, in order to address areas where confirmation 
would not otherwise be granted (s.152(2)). The Registrar must confirm transactions required to be submitted 
to a registrar if satisfied the documentation is in order, that any required resolution of assembled owners 
meets set standards and that the proposed alienation does not contravene any trust the land is subject to or 
the provisions of the 1993 Act (s.160).
tHe BUSineSS And prActicAl context
AttitUdeS of privAte lendinG inStitUtionS
There is no readily available body of evidence documenting attitudes of private lending institutions to 
proposals for development of under-utilised Ma-ori land.27 This paper assumes these institutions will consider 
Ma-ori business proposals involving Ma-ori land on a case-by-case basis, rather than rejecting proposals 
involving such land as a class. If risk-averse private institutions do decide to avoid an asset class, by reason 
of its perceived or actual complexity, that is their decision. A spokesperson for Westpac NZ has indicated 
that business proposals involving Ma-ori land might be of lower priority for institutions able to obtain easier 
business elsewhere.28 The process set out above that must be followed to properly secure a mortgage of 
Ma-ori land certainly implies greater costs of transacting than for an equivalent parcel of general land.
Proposals to commercialise undeveloped Ma-ori land can be categorised as start-up businesses. Westpac NZ 
makes clear in its business start-up guide that applicants for debt finance should provide information on: 
track record and credit history; amount sought and purpose for borrowing; how and when the amount will 
be repaid; and what the borrowing might be secured against. Westpac also dampens any assumption that 
owner’s equity can be minimal: 
While every business case is different, lenders or investors will usually expect the owners to put up at 
least half the money themselves for a new business. And the reality for many new businesses is that 
getting a loan or investment money is very hard—many simply don’t meet normal lending or investor 
criteria at first. So you may find you need to raise the money by using your savings, accessing your home 
loan or by getting private loans from family and supporters (Newman-Hall 2004: 22).
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What do prospective borrowers have to offer to obtain a loan? Westpac NZ makes clear that business assets 
will often not be sufficient security: 
In some cases a lender can use business assets as security. But generally for most new businesses you’ll 
need to provide some sort of personal security as well, such as a mortgage over your home or a personal 
guarantee. Obviously this is not something you should do lightly, because if something happens to the 
business it could leave you with a personal debt (Newman-Hall 2004: 23).
From the Bank’s perspective this is prudent protection against lightly capitalised small enterprises, usually 
with separate legal personality from their owners. After all, the business assets might not be readily saleable 
or worth much in the event of default. These factors might well apply to much undeveloped Ma-ori land. But 
personal guarantees from office holders in relation to their own homes do not appear to be a ready fit for 
the collective owners of Ma-ori land (the situation would be different if some of the owners had leased the 
land from the group of owners for a new enterprise to benefit the lessees).
The key message appears to be that the strength of the business case is the first-order issue for lending 
institutions focused on risk management. Second is the strength of the people standing behind the 
proposal—essentially their skills, character and credit-worthiness.29 What is their personal commitment and 
stake in the proposal? Sound governance of a block of land covered by a business proposal will include 
ensuring that ownership records are up to date and the block is surveyed and registered. Failure to address 
these preliminary matters is a significant practical barrier to getting started in business. Finding appropriate 
security for lending is a question that arises if the two preceding questions are addressed to the lender’s 
satisfaction.
AttitUdeS of BorrowerS
The Hui Taumata (Ma-ori economic summit) of March 2005 is a useful source of recent viewpoints on debt 
finance and the building of relationships with bankers for Ma-ori business. A range of contributors accepted 
that producing ‘bankable’ business plans is essential for borrowing along with building relationships with 
lending institutions. It was also acknowledged that the collective ownership of Ma-ori land makes it a less 
favourable investment option than general land.30 Further, there was acceptance of the need to generate 
fresh sources of funding to break the lingering perception of Ma-ori asset owners as dependent on the 
state for project funding. While the Hui Taumata might have unleashed a very productive debate about 
generating Ma-ori wealth for the future, there is undoubtedly a conservative constituency of people in 
governance positions for Ma-ori land unwilling to put a group’s remaining Ma-ori land at risk for short-term 
commercial objectives. To these people the stewardship responsibilities they carry for future generations 
mean this land cannot be treated as just another business asset (see Robertson 2005, comparing tenure 
systems; Reeves 2005a, questioning conservative ‘keep the land’ at all costs attitudes). This can be reflected 
in very conservative asset management and low rates of return. It might also reflect present lower levels of 
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financial literacy than will be found in the next generation of leaders (e.g. ‘Land slide: Diversifying Ma-ori 
business’, Sunday Star Times, 27 February 2005).
One approach of borrowers that might be gathering momentum is to leverage development finance from 
general land and apply it to under-developed Ma-ori land. In this scenario the general land is purchased 
and mortgaged specifically to raise development money without putting Ma-ori land at risk in the event of 
default (see reference to Tumunui Lands Trust example, cited by June McCabe (Westpac Bank), Radio New 
Zealand Mana News, 3 March 2005; ‘Land slide: Diversifying Ma-ori business’, Sunday Star Times, 27 February 
2005). Other alternatives currently being considered include seeking private equity/venture capital in place 
of bank finance, debt funding from foreign sources (such as occurred for the first Tuaropaki geothermal 
energy plant) and micro-finance (Reeves 2005b). Personal property securities can also be created over non-
land assets (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc 2003: 86). Situations where ownership of the 
produce of land is separated from the land (e.g. forestry rights) might also yield further innovations. The 
future may thus see a shift in emphasis from managing risks in debt finance from security granted over 
assets towards managing that risk on a project basis. It might also see greater chances of Ma-ori leveraging 
their existing asset base more aggressively by cooperating to lend to or borrow from other Ma-ori entities 
(New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc 2003).
SpeciAliSt BAnKinG prodUctS
Westpac NZ is one of New Zealand’s major trading banks. Its approach to business start-up issues is set out 
above because it also has a specialist ‘Ma-ori in Business’ team that can assist staff from throughout the 
organisation to be as responsive as possible to the needs of Ma-ori business clients. However, Westpac NZ does 
not have a separate suite of products or services for Ma-ori business clients. Rather, the role of the specialist 
team is to help to ensure that the bank’s standard products and services are relevant and useful to Ma-ori in 
business, and training is available to staff to assist them to be as responsive as possible. Westpac NZ describes 
itself as partnering with Ma-ori to promote and assist in the development of a sustainable infrastructure 
that will meet the long term economic needs and aspirations of Ma-ori communities, businesses and wha-nau 
(pers. comm. Y. Codde, National Business Development Manager Westpac NZ Ltd, 2 August 2005).
The New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development and Westpac NZ (2005) have recently 
published a booklet encouraging tribes with settlement assets from successful Treaty of Waitangi claims to 
plan to build those assets into sustainable Ma-ori enterprises, with guidance and case studies on enterprise 
development. Efficient utilisation of Ma-ori-owned assets and related issues about entity structures are now 
current topics of interest to professional services firms as well as at least some financial institutions (e.g. 
Stone 2006). 
The two case studies presented here demonstrate a number of practical issues in accessing private-sector 
finance to develop Ma-ori land. One is a business failure and the other is a promising development, albeit one 
that is at an early stage.
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This is a select sample. Others studies have reported on the range of successful Ma-ori enterprises across 
industry and service groups (Federation of Ma-ori Authorities Inc and Te Puni Ko-kiri/Ministry of Ma-ori 
Development 2003, 2004; New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Business Development and Westpac 
NZ 2005). It is also important to acknowledge that many well-established and successful businesses on Ma-ori 
freehold land have succeeded in establishing solid relationships with financial institutions. These two cases 
illustrate challenges in utilising Ma-ori freehold land in development proposals. Both cases came to notice 
because they generated recent litigation reported in the New Zealand Law Reports. For this reason, there is 
a base of publicly available information, positive and negative, about these enterprises.
cASe StUdY 1: eternAl SprinGS And proprietorS of MAtAUri x 
incorporAted
Matauri X Incorporation was formed in March 1967 as a combined ownership vehicle for 544.3 hectares of 
multiply-owned Ma-ori freehold land at Matauri Bay, Northland, New Zealand.
Matauri X was asset rich and cash poor. Although its Matauri Bay land was worth $9 million or more, 
there was little income with which to pay local authority rates. With the support of other members of 
the committee, Mr Rapata [the chairperson of the committee of management] was keen to raise funds 
for investment in off-site business ventures. He planned to use the Matauri Bay land as security for the 
loans (Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors of Matauri X Inc [2005] 3 NZLR 193 (CA) paragraph 4).
The committee of management of Matauri X Incorporation entered a joint venture to purchase and operate 
a water bottling plant in Whakatane, Bay of Plenty New Zealand. The ‘Eternal Springs’ joint venture involved 
two other partners. One was an engineer with trade contacts and expertise in water bottling. The other was 
an investment company, MTech Investments Ltd. The chairperson of Matauri X’s committee of management 
knew the principals of MTech. 
MTech’s function was to locate businesses and investments in which it would invest by way of joint 
venture with Ma-ori incorporations. The concept was that MTech would provide the opportunities and  
Ma-ori incorporations the capital raised on the security of their land (Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors 
of Matauri X Inc [2005] 3 NZLR 193 (CA) paragraph 5).
The joint venture was for one-third equal shares but was capitalised unequally as follows: Mtech—
$300,000; the engineer—nothing; Matauri X—$1million. MTech’s identification and promotion of the 
scheme and the engineer’s provision of critical knowledge and trade contacts were the reasons given to 
justify unequal equity contributions. In addition to its equity contribution, Matauri X was to loan $1million 
to the investment company run by the joint venturers for operating purposes. To finance its $2million 
contribution to establishing this business, Matauri X was to borrow $2.55million, secured by mortgaging 
the Incorporation’s land at Matauri Bay. The $550,000 in borrowings not allocated to the project was to 
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pay expenses (including a $200,000 ‘establishment fee’ to the lender) and prepay interest on the loan for a 
period ($200,000 capitalised interest).31
MTech Ltd projected for Matauri X that its $2million investment would yield $11.5 million within two years: 
in other words, a projected return of more than 275 per cent per annum. The management of Matauri X 
did not appear to have been alarmed that such a rate of return might indicate a highly speculative business 
proposition.
Matauri X Incorporation was introduced to Bridgecorp Finance Ltd. The Bridgecorp group is a finance 
company rather than a registered bank. Its lending business operates beyond normal bank lending criteria. 
It aims at the bridging finance and project finance segments of the market and prefers to make short-term 
loans of up to two years. These are generally secured by mortgages against land. Its lending is funded 
principally by offering investors debt instruments.32
Bridgecorp’s terms for the $2.55million loan offered, in addition to the $200,000 establishment fee and 
$200,000 prepaid interest noted above, included that the loan be for 12 months with a 12-month renewal 
option (rollover) with interest at 14 per cent per annum. The capitalised interest would be exhausted first. 
Security for this loan was to include a registered first mortgage over the Incorporation’s land at Matauri 
Bay. 
Bridgecorp’s loan offer was open for just two days. The reasons for the short period are not obvious given 
the relatively cumbersome ownership structure for the land. In any event the loan offer was accepted on 
the day it was made by the Chairperson of the Matauri X committee of management. Three days later the 
management committee met to consider developments. At that meeting the committee resolved to endorse 
and support the Eternal Springs proposal including the loan from Bridgecorp. Again, the management of 
Matauri X did not appear to have questioned the business case for offering land worth at least $9million as 
security for a loan of $2.55million.
Thirteen days after the loan offer was made the Chairperson and Secretary of Matauri X Incorporation 
signed mortgage and loan documentation. Bridgecorp advanced the loan money the following day. Nearly a 
month later the mortgage was registered against title records for the land under New Zealand’s land transfer 
system. Meantime, the existence of the mortgage against this Ma-ori freehold land had been noted by a 
Ma-ori Land Court Registrar, meeting the requirements of the 1993 Act. Nearly three months after the deal 
was signed a shareholders’ resolution was passed at the Annual General Meeting of Matauri X Incorporation 
supporting the decision of the management committee to invest in Eternal Springs (2,509 votes in support 
and 1,800 in opposition).
The projected returns sounded too good to be true, and they were. Before long the business collapsed, in 
spite of a further injection of $750,000 from Matauri X Incorporation, also borrowed from Bridgecorp. The 
joint venture company was put into receivership. For Matauri X Incorporation this meant its $1million equity 
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interest in Eternal Springs was lost and its $1.75million loan to that business was unrecoverable. Matauri X 
Incorporation remained responsible to Bridgecorp for the loans to fund this failed investment that were 
secured by mortgage against Matauri’s land. At this point, Matauri X had not repaid any principal. It had not 
paid any further interest on the capitalised interest being used up.
Bridgecorp moved to realise its investment by exercising its powers under the mortgage. Matauri X argued 
it did not have power to borrow the money and grant the mortgage. Bridgecorp brought legal proceedings 
against Matauri X Incorporation seeking to uphold the mortgage. Before examining that litigation it is worth 
continuing with the chronology.
As a result of the business failure, the actions of the committee of management were scrutinised and 
criticised. This led to litigation in the Ma-ori Land Court to, among other things, remove the committee of 
management (that litigation is not examined here). The Ma-ori Land Court appointed an administrator to take 
over management of the land and to formulate proposals for repaying the debt. A number of proposals were 
explored with shareholders. One involved leasing a large portion of the Matauri X’s land to a neighbouring 
landowner for a term of 60 years. Under this proposal, the Ma-ori owners would lose the use of their land 
for a long period but retain ownership. Another proposal was to subdivide 10 hectares of the land near 
the prime coastal part of the block (the Incorporation’s land includes sought-after coastal frontage) and 
lease residential sections for 52-year terms. A further proposal was to sell a portion of the block. It appears 
these proposals did not garner ready acceptance from shareholders. New Zealand media reported from time 
to time on delays associated with resolving this issue of liability and the factions that formed within the 
430-odd shareholders. The single largest shareholding is held by a Member of Parliament which may help to 
account for this situation receiving a reasonable amount of media scrutiny.
In April and May 2005 the New Zealand Herald reported that a finance company had moved to institute 
a mortgagee sale of the land to recover money owed. A tender process was advertised with the real estate 
firm reporting ‘a strong level of enquiry’ about the land (see New Zealand Herald 5 April 2005 ‘Matauri X 
block up for mortgagee sale’ and 11 May 2005 ‘Matauri land tender in limbo’, both by T. Gee; the second 
reported that Matauri X owed nearly $5million in principal and unpaid interest). It was reported that the 
court-appointed administrator of the land commenced proceedings seeking an injunction from the courts 
to prevent the mortgagee sale occurring before existing litigation about the lending was resolved. It appears 
the mortgagee sale was put on hold without the matter being decided by a court, most probably because of 
a 3 May 2005 decision by the Court of Appeal.
Returning to the litigation generated by Matauri X Incorporation’s refusal to honour the loan and mortgage 
arrangements, two key issues were argued before the High Court and Court of Appeal.33 First, did Matauri X 
Incorporation have power to mortgage its land for this off-site investment in Eternal Springs? Secondly, did 
Bridgecorp Finance, as lender, have to satisfy itself that Matauri X Incorporation was in a position to validly 
execute a mortgage in favour of Bridgecorp?
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The second paragraph of the High Court judgment of Fisher J neatly encapsulates Matauri X Incorporation’s 
failure on the first issue:
I have concluded that Matauri X did have the power to borrow the money for the Eternal Springs 
investment. It is true that one of the objects of Te Ture Whenua Ma-ori Act 1993 is to halt the 
dispossession, alienation and fragmentation of Ma-ori land. But another is to place the destiny of Ma-ori 
land in the collective hands of its owners and their duly appointed representatives. In this Act Parliament 
has recognised Ma-ori as adults capable of coming together to determine the way in which their own 
land will be dealt with in a modern world. If that includes mortgaging the land, that is their prerogative. 
But everyone knows that if money borrowed on mortgage is not repaid, the mortgagee takes the land. 
One cannot have it both ways. Matauri X had the power to borrow on mortgage but cannot escape 
the consequences (Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors of Matauri X Incorporation [2004] 2 NZLR 792 
Fisher J at paragraph 2).
Fisher J decided that Bridgecorp, as lender, did not have to go behind representations made by officers 
of Matauri X Incorporation in order to satisfy itself that Matauri X could validly execute the mortgage, 
thus deciding the second legal issue.34 In company and incorporations law this is known as the ‘indoor 
management rule.’ An outside party is entitled to assume that a corporate has complied with its own rules 
in order to enter a transaction. Fisher J saw the rule’s application to Ma-ori incorporations as an important 
point of principle in order to support the objective that Ma-ori incorporations can participate in regular 
commercial activity.
The scheme of the 1993 Act was that Ma-ori land should be retained but that land proprietors have autonomy 
to put land ownership at risk by mortgaging it. Fisher J found that changes to the powers of Ma-ori 
incorporations brought about by the 1993 Act meant the original objects of Matauri X Incorporation had 
been broadened. This mortgage fell within those extended powers.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the High Court judgment was overturned.35 However, this was not a clear 
victory for Matauri X Incorporation. The case was remitted to the High Court for further argument on 
three issues not fully explored while the parties had pursued primary knock-out issues about whether the 
mortgage was validly granted or not.36
The Court of Appeal held Matauri X Incorporation did not have power to grant the mortgage for this off-site 
investment in shares in Eternal Springs because it was beyond the objects of the Incorporation. The Court 
of Appeal made clear that mortgaging land itself was not a separate object of the Incorporation given the 
scheme overall of the 1993 Act, thereby disagreeing with the High Court judge. Only borrowing for an object 
was permissible. Having decided this, the Court of Appeal did not need to address the High Court’s legal 
finding about the indoor management rule. In this sense, the result in the Court of Appeal turns on a technical 
legal issue not closely connected with the subject of this paper. For present purposes the important point 
to note is that critical changes in the law about the powers of Ma-ori incorporations were not considered by 
the High Court judge, so he made errors of statutory interpretation that made his conclusion unsustainable. 
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What the Court of Appeal did was to follow the statute much more closely to show the way these changes 
occurred over time, then applying that law to the chronology of the case.
In general terms these changes in the powers of Ma-ori incorporations can be described as follows. When 
Matauri X was incorporated it was empowered to strive to achieve defined objects. As a body corporate 
if it wanted to act beyond those objects it had to obtain approval from its shareholders and apply to the 
Ma-ori Land Court to have the objects amended. In other words, although the Incorporation was constituted 
a separate legal person it did not have the freedom to act that a natural person does. Its actions were 
constrained to achieving its objects. Under the statute then in force, the Ma-ori Affairs Act 1953, the objects 
of Ma-ori incorporations had to relate exclusively to the land vested in each incorporation.
When policy makers reformed Ma-ori land law in the 1993 Act they settled on a reform that would grant 
Ma-ori Incorporations full capacity to act for any lawful purpose subject to express limitations imposed on 
the incorporation by Ma-ori Land Court processes. Thus, incorporations were to be given general competency 
to act without the constraint of defined ‘objects.’ 
As initially operative from 1 July 1993, the 1993 Act did not require shareholders or incorporations to 
take any action to use the new broad general power of competency. However, within a short time this 
enormous change was wound back somewhat. Later in 1993 an amending Act was passed, and operated from 
28 September 1993, to ensure that shareholders of incorporations would consciously move from the object-
limited world to the new wider general competency to act by passing a resolution at a general meeting to 
that effect and obtaining an order subsequently from the Ma-ori Land Court sanctioning this change. After 
all, land might have been contributed to an incorporation on the understanding the incorporation’s powers 
were confined to specified objects. More broadly, shareholders might prefer to restrict the incorporation’s 
freedom to act.
The High Court judge did not take account of this amendment modifying the policy change.37 The shareholders 
of Matauri X had not passed the required resolution. Therefore, the off-site investment in Eternal Springs 
remained beyond the object-bound Matauri X Incorporation at the time the loan contract and mortgage 
were entered into.
Before any further argument in the High Court occurred, Bridgecorp appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
parties were granted leave to argue whether the borrowing and granting of the mortgage was within the 
Incorporation’s powers.38
The Supreme Court was to have heard this appeal in July 2005. However, the case was adjourned indefinitely 
to allow settlement negotiations to continue.39 A settlement was concluded in late March 2006. Under the 
settlement, the debt of over $5million was compromised to $4.3million and refinanced against the land. 
The compromise involved the lender waiving penalty interest and fees on the debt and the Incorporation 
voting to change its objects to allow borrowings to be secured against the land. Part of the land will be 
subdivided into residential sections for long-term lease. The rescue plan is that the revenue from those leases 
will enable the debt to be repaid and accumulate a surplus to purchase the improvements on the sections at 
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the conclusion of leases. However, the timeframe involved is long, meaning Incorporation owners will have 
a daily reminder for the next 50 years or so of the cause of a large holiday home subdivision on their land 
(Checkpoint, Radio New Zealand, 27 March 2006). The agreed rescue plan is the subject of further litigation. 
The largest shareholder recently failed to obtain an injunction to halt the subdivision while the Ma-ori Land 
Court determines his application to exclude several hectares of the land from being affected because it is 
land where his immediate family is said to have particular interests.
cASe StUdY 2: HirUHArAMA ponUi, tAUpo
-
The trustee management of the Hiruharama Ponui Block Incorporation wanted to raise finance against 
the Incorporation’s land for a forestry proposal and to pay local government rates. Development prospects 
appeared to have stalled as the Incorporation struggled to convince financiers and developers that the 
shareholders would in fact vote to lease the land to fund development proposals.
The shareholders of the Incorporation voted to create a nominee company, leasing some of its land to this 
company for 80 years at a nominal rental and authorising the committee of management to negotiate 
a commercial development proposal so that the lease could be varied to suit the particular development 
settled upon and then assigned to the development enterprise. The lease was registered against the title 
to the land. By resolving to lease the land, the shareholders of the Incorporation demonstrated that they 
were prepared to lease their land for a long term for development purposes. This put the committee of 
management in a stronger position to negotiate a development proposal.
The leased land comprises 19 hectares beside Lake Taupo-, a highly regarded holiday destination in the 
North Island, where waterfront land for development is tightly controlled. A business deal was subsequently 
agreed between the management of the Incorporation and a property developer. Under this agreement, the 
development company would take over the lease of the land at a commercial rental, be granted a right of 
first refusal for a further lease and be granted rights to issue subleases after developing some of the land 
into a high quality residential enclave featuring condominiums, a lodge, chalets and possibly a hotel. The 
parties’ intention was that the property developer would transform this undeveloped lakeside land into a 
high quality development where private interests would purchase sub-leases.40 These sub-leases would be 
freely tradable for the remaining term of the lease, and any renewal. Furthermore, buildings (improvements) 
would be constructed on this land by either the developer or sub-lessees, and compensation would be paid 
by the Incorporation for these improvements at the conclusion of the lease.
What were the key elements of this arrangement for those involved? The Incorporation leased out land 
losing the use of it for a long period of 80 years, obtained a commercial rental stream for doing so, and 
(subject to paying a compensation formula for the improvements) ended up with ownership of a developed 
‘residential enclave’ on prime lakefront land at the conclusion of the lease. The developer saw an opportunity 
for additional development in a tightly controlled market, albeit in relation to land that was not available for 
outright sale. The considerable costs and risk of development were obviously assessed as worthwhile given 
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demand for Taupo-ō lakefront land. The developer calculated that subsequent purchasers of sub-leases would 
accept an interest less than freehold and that the lease term was sufficiently long to justify both the expense 
of development and considerable investment in improvements by the lessee and sub-lessees.
Both the Incorporation and, more particularly, the developer anticipated that the strength of the Taupo-
market for land, especially lakefront land, is such that prospective purchasers would not be put off by the 
fact that the underlying title is Ma-ori freehold land and that the purchase was of a sub-leasehold interest 
only. The courage of this assessment should not be underestimated because there have been relatively few 
pockets of leasehold estates created over Ma-ori land (apart from particular statutory schemes forcing Ma-ori 
to lease land, for example, to farmers on long-term leases). This is particularly so for the leisure/exclusive 
residential market at which this development was aimed. 
In the light of this attitudinal context it seems to have been of particular importance to the Incorporation 
and the developer that purchasers of these sub-leasehold interests not be required by law to obtain the 
approval of the Ma-ori Land Court before they could sell or otherwise deal in their interests. Under one 
possible interpretation of the 1993 Act, would-be sellers would have to obtain confirmation from the Ma-ori 
Land Court system of every proposed sale and on-sale of a sub-lease, rather than being able to trade these 
interests freely in the open market. That was seen as diminishing the marketability of the proposal and the 
free ability to trade these sub-leasehold interests. It would also have increased transaction costs.
The High Court issued two decisions after proceedings were initiated to obtain declarations about the legality 
of this deal.41 The fact that declaratory court proceedings were brought is significant. It demonstrated that 
both the management of the Incorporation and the property developer were keen to ensure the significant 
commitment each was making to the project would not be undone later by having overlooked legal 
issues. The examination of these issues by the High Court is also significant in that, generally speaking, the 
Ma-ori Land Court has performed a role of scrutinising potential major transactions under the 1993 Act as 
a protective function for landowners. Here, because of the approach of first granting a lease to a related 
nominee company, the Ma-ori Land Court did not get to scrutinise the property developer’s commercial 
proposal under the law as it then stood. Indeed, the Incorporation and the developer wanted confirmation 
from the High Court that their proposals did not require formal approval or confirmation by the Ma-ori Land 
Court.
The matter had to be argued twice before the High Court. The first time around, the Incorporation and the 
developer failed to persuade the judge that the variation of the lease and its assignment to the developer 
did not need to go before the Ma-ori Land Court for approval. On release of this judgment in March 2003, 
the Incorporation and the developer applied to have it recalled and amended on the basis of overlooked 
legal issues and further evidence was led about the processes that had been followed.42 This application was 
successful, meaning the judgment was recalled and amended by the judge in August 2003. The High Court 
found in its second judgment that the variation of the lease to commercial terms and its assignment to the 
developer from the nominee company did not require the approval of the Ma-ori Land Court, as these events 
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were within the authority of the initial alienation by lease approved by the shareholders of the Incorporation 
and taken through the Ma-ori Land Court confirmation process. The case also decided that the sub-interests 
created below the first lease were consistent with it so that approval to create the lease extended to approval 
to create tradable sub-interests. This meant that the creation of and subsequent trade in these sub-interests 
did not have to be confirmed by Ma-ori Land Court processes for the duration of the lease.
The technical legal reasons for both decisions turn on the proper interpretation of changes to the 1993 Act 
made in 2002. By these changes, the role of the Ma-ori Land Court in relation to alienations of land was 
amended significantly. That role is summarised in the section above setting out relevant aspects of the 1993 
Act. The discussion here is focused on the content of the development proposal for this under-developed 
Ma-ori land, rather than determining whether the old and new controls on alienation of Ma-ori land were 
complied with given that the timing of transactions for this development proposal fell across both periods.
Following the court cases, development work began in earnest with processes to obtain resource consent 
from the local territorial authority. This public process brought some negative publicity to the development. 
In July 2005 the Ma-ori Television Service news ran a complaint about this land and how it was being lost to 
Ma-ori. Its use as land leased for a period rather than sold was not mentioned. The tone of the item was that 
important lakeside land was being lost for Ma-ori customary uses and was to be instead a new sub-division. A 
representative of the Incorporation said that sacred sites would be protected in the development and picnic 
areas for owners would be developed from income received. The news item concluded with a prediction that 
protests would result (Te Kaea, Ma-ori Television Service, 4 July 2005).
Some protest has occurred. In July 2006 media reported on controversy around whether the discovery of 
human remains on the site during earthworks in January 2006 was wrongly concealed from tribal members for 
up to six months (M. Watson ‘Row over subdivision skeleton’, The Dominion Post, 17 July 2006). Furthermore, 
as at August 2006 there is litigation before the Ma-ori Appellate Court about whether the Committee of 
Management was properly appointed and lawfully able to enter into the lease transaction and variation 
to commercial terms for this development.43 Protest threats involving Ma-ori land could readily threaten 
investor confidence and are not conducive to selling rights in that land to all comers. Marketing efforts 
for the development have included a website, sales brochures and extensive print media advertising.44 The 
website includes an open letter of endorsement from the Incorporation describing their work with developer 
as a successful partnership. The land under development has been named Parawera.
The promotional material makes clear to prospective purchasers that in each release of sections in the 
Parawera development there are two options. The first is to purchase a sub-leasehold section to build upon. 
The second is to purchase a one-eighth interest in a sub-leasehold section along with one of eight ‘fisherman’s 
retreats’ or similar chalets built for the purchasers on that block. The promotional material contains an 
explanation of the leasehold tenure: ‘Each purchaser receives an individual sub-leasehold title which can be 
mortgaged and re-sold on the open market’. Further on: ‘Each purchaser receives a sub-leasehold title for a 
term expiring one day before the Head Lease.’
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The promotional material also emphasises that should no fresh lease be offered on terms acceptable to the 
head lessee (presently the development company) then the Incorporation must purchase all improvements 
on the development block. In other words, as described in the sales material, the landowners do not 
appear to have the option of adjusting the area made subject to a subsequent lease and buying out the 
improvements in stages. Presumably the sales material describes the situation this way in order to reassure 
prospective purchasers that all owners will be treated the same way should no further lease be offered. The 
documentation also makes clear that the head lessee has discretion to refuse any further lease offered by 
the Incorporation. If this occurred, the Incorporation would have to purchase the improvements on the land 
as the lease relationship would be at an end. The formula for purchasing improvements from sub-lessees, if 
no further lease is offered, values the improvements on each block, ignores land value, and deducts 15 per 
cent of the value of the improvements. This amount is then owed to each sub-lessee. As well as the one-off 
sale price to secure a sub-leasehold interest in a land block for nearly 80 years, purchasers must also meet 
annual ground rent obligations (reviewed every eight years) and their share of the body corporate charges. 
These charges are to maintain the common facilities which include shared recreational facilities as well as 
more mundane things like roads and paths. Estimates of these are provided in the promotional material. 
At August 2006 it appears the development has been completed and sub-leasehold interests in the land 
blocks at the Parawera development are still being actively marketed for sale.
pointS of intereSt to people worKinG witH indiGenoUS lAndowninG 
coMMUnitieS in AUStrAliA
Having set out two case studies and background information about the New Zealand situation, the purpose 
of this section is to offer some remarks about those circumstances that might be relevant to people working 
with Indigenous landowning communities in Australia. At present there is some focus in Australia on asking 
how more under-developed Indigenous-owned land might be committed to commercial projects. Obviously 
there are many differences in the way that Ma-ori land is regulated in New Zealand from land rights land 
or native title land in Australian jurisdictions. The focus here is not on trying to describe those differences. 
At a broader level, however, a number of the challenges faced by Ma-ori owners of under-developed land 
appear interesting in light of current debates about increasing economic activity on Indigenous-owned land 
in Australia.
There is a regulatory environment constraining the manner in which Ma-ori freehold land can be lawfully 
mortgaged. Once it is mortgaged, however, it may be sold in the event of default by a mortgagee in 
possession, as for general land. The availability of this conventional legal remedy does not appear to have 
changed lenders’ attitudes as a group in any fundamental sense. Instead there appears to be a reluctance 
to regard undeveloped Ma-ori freehold land as adequate or appropriate security by itself. For business rather 
than legal reasons the category of Ma-ori land does not appear to be assured as bankable. 
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Higher costs of transactions involving Ma-ori land must inhibit some activity. This flows from more complex 
ownership structures involving large numbers of affected people, as well as legal obligations that require a 
significant range of transactions be examined by the Ma-ori Land Court system. These costs are a trade-off 
for the protective system the Court is meant to operate and the cultural reasons for ownership of the land 
being widely held. That protective system is avoided when land is removed from the Ma-ori land system 
or when (re)acquired land is not added to that system by communities wanting to avoid: these costs, any 
chilling effect that the status of Ma-ori land might have in establishing or maintaining relationships with 
financiers, as well as public scrutiny by judges of commercial transactions that would otherwise remain 
largely private if executed over general land.
Strong proposals for developing under-developed land focus heavily on the strength of the business case 
put forward for utlilising that land. For the Hiruharama Ponui Incorporation it seems that the business case 
for the property developer aligned sufficiently with that of the owners as the landlord only when there was 
a firm proposal for a long lease of the land.
Strictly speaking, the Matauri X Incorporation case was not about development of the under-developed 
land asset of that Incorporation. Rather, the Incorporation’s land was secured for a loan to initiate an off-
site investment. A second tier financial institution was prepared to finance that investment given the much 
higher value of the Matauri X’s land secured by mortgage and the Matauri X’s willingness to pay a high 
interest rate in recognition of the risk levels. Matauri X’s investment was a failure. The eventual compromise 
of the resulting litigation between the Incorporation and the finance company, after a number of years, 
shows there was no ready mechanism to separate the parties to the deal once it soured. 
The fact that complex litigation resulted, challenging the mortgagee’s ability to sell the land on default, 
might reinforce perceptions of the wisdom of risk averse financial institutions avoiding a market segment 
that might attract significant and negative publicity as well as litigation when the owners face the prospect 
of the land being sold because of a mortgage default. In such circumstances the lender’s legal right to 
address default by selling the land forms only a part of the overall risk profile of such lending. There are also 
costs for lenders and borrowers to consider in establishing, monitoring and recovering lending against such 
land.45 Equally, the Matauri X example demonstrates that even borrowers in a comparatively weak position 
can secure some finance. The price to be paid is in the terms and conditions on which that finance is made 
available.
This brings to the fore the weakness in internal governance capacity illustrated by the Matauri X example. 
At one level those on the committee of management acted responsibly. They sought and received advice 
from an independent investment company, as well as other professional advisers. At another level the group 
in charge failed a basic test in evaluating the credibility of the business proposal put in front of them and 
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might have been vulnerable to advisor capture. ‘If the returns sound too good to be true they probably 
are’ is the aphorism given in hindsight to this example. Professor Mason Durie summarised the situation as 
follows:
A combination of limited business acumen, misunderstandings between management and shareholders, 
and unrealistic expectations of the legislative protection from commercial realities had combined to 
deliver a harsh and costly lesson to the incorporation, with timely warnings for the governance and 
management committees of similar bodies (Durie 2005: 76–8).
The practical result for the Matauri X landowners is that they remain responsible for this debt. Debating 
the validity of the mortgage granted over the land, responsibility for ensuring any mortgage was valid, and 
the legal effects of registering the mortgage actually executed will have been an expensive exercise. All 
of the proposals for a way through this situation that have been publicised acknowledge this reality. The 
compromise resolution of this dispute, reached in late March 2006, means the owners will lose use of some 
of the land for approximately two generations in order to repay the debt.
The Hiruharama Ponui study should be acknowledged as a successful enterprise. Yet it is worth reflecting on 
the route taken in order to minimise engagement with the supervisory regulatory regime under the 1993 Act. 
This involved an initial lease to a nominee company controlled by the landowners. It was that transaction 
that was scrutinised by the Ma-ori Land Court rather than the subsequent transfer and variation of that 
lease to commercial terms—when the commercial property developer came on board. Further, it appears 
to have been important to the parties that all subsequent trade in the sub-leasehold units created by their 
scheme not have to engage with the protective system for dealings in land under the 1993 Act, but instead 
be tradable freely on the ‘open’ market. This further casts the protective jurisdiction discharged by the Ma-ori 
Land Court as a barrier, adding complexity as well as additional costs to commercial dealings involving 
Ma-ori land such as this one.46 It might also indicate a lack of confidence by commercial participants in 
operating with certainty within that protective system. A stimulus paper on Ma-ori assets for the Hui Taumata 
2005 suggested ‘The Court does not necessarily have the entrepreneurial vision that might support a more 
business-focused approach to utilisation of assets’ (Reeves 2005a: 22). This is a considerable challenge given 
the very small size of the Ma-ori Land Court bench relative to the rest of the New Zealand judiciary, as 
well as the legal boundaries limiting the ability of litigants to appeal decisions of the Ma-ori Land Court to 
courts of general jurisdiction where commercial disputes are more usually adjudicated. The challenge must 
be weighed up, however, against the benefits of a specialist branch of the judiciary allocated a socially 
important protective task.
Another point to take from the Hiruharama Ponui study was the route taken by the landowners to sell the 
development opportunity to a commercial property developer along with the risks and rewards that went 
with that opportunity. That left the owners in the relatively lower risk position of being the landlord of 
someone else’s project rather than in control of the whole scheme. There is no doubt a range of good reasons 
for this arm’s length or indirect investment approach in this case. But it is worth remembering the general 
point that the owners struggled to attract investor interest in proposals for this prime lakeside land until a 
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long-term lease was in place. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that at the conclusion of the lease, or 
after any renewals, the landowners will control a fully developed and maintained asset by purchasing from 
the lessee and sub-lessees the improvements constructed on the land. Whether at that time this purchase 
process will have to be financed from retained rental monies, or whether debt finance will be available to 
the Incorporation, remains to be seen.
The issue of whose development this is appears to remain a current issue for the owners of the Hiruharama 
Ponui Incorporation. There may be some tension amongst the wider community of owners in an outsider 
controlling this property development, albeit under a commercial lease freely negotiated between the 
Incorporation’s management and the property developer. There was negative publicity that Hiruharama 
Ponui owners were going to be shut out (literally) of the gated community built on this land and would be 
left with a picnic area to one side. There is some history of Ma-ori landowners making available, or being 
forced by legislation to make available, their land for farming and forestry developments and concern 
that Ma-ori landowners were not in control of these enterprises or in strong partnership relationships.47 In 
this development, criticism has also been levelled at the committee of management about how it handled 
the discovery of human remains during earthworks for the development and the community’s right to be 
informed about that discovery and to take appropriate action in relation to it. There is presently litigation 
about the authority of the committee of management to lawfully commit the owners to the transaction at 
all.
Since the end of state-funded Ma-ori land development schemes in New Zealand there has been little by way 
of direct state support for under-developed Ma-ori land beyond ideas such as promoting a business-friendly 
environment, state-sponsored general business mentoring and literature on how to go about engaging 
in enterprise development.48 Market forces drive the availability of development finance. Conventional 
legal remedies such as the mortgagee’s ability to sell Ma-ori land secured by mortgage in the event of 
default have not made Ma-ori land bankable as an asset class. There is no New Zealand equivalent of the 
Australian state-controlled Indigenous Business Australia or the Indigenous Land Corporation. There are 
limited development funds controlled by private Ma-ori institutions. There does not appear to be evidence 
of Indigenous-controlled wealth being pooled across tribal boundaries for higher order cooperation and to 
circumvent limited financial sector interest in under-developed Ma-ori land.
Experience in remote Australia suggests that a goal of developing under-developed Indigenous-owned land 
will not of itself be the driver of private-sector finance availability. On its own terms, whether this land 
was freely alienable or not, much of this land is in the poorest land classes and is remote from markets. 
Rather, land use might be a component of a credible business proposal that successfully attracts finance.49 A 
credible business plan is central to project-based finance using assets that might not otherwise easily attract 
a lender. Research into the attitudes and preparedness of major Australian financial institutions to lend 
against Indigenous-owned land where alienation is restricted would be a valuable addition to the current 
policy debate about the benefits or drawbacks of making land rights land more readily alienable, including 
by long-term leases to government entities.
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This paper has suggested that, in common with many small enterprises in start-up mode, there are 
practical barriers ahead of legal constraints to borrowing money secured against Ma-ori land. These turn 
to a considerable degree on the strength of the business case and the strengths of the people promoting 
that case. After all, lenders are very interested in the management skills and intentions of prospective 
borrowers. Where landowners cannot point to a strong track record of robust and prudent governance of 
their collectively-owned land assets it must be difficult to establish or maintain strong relationships with 
financial institutions. It is not surprising if those institutions admit that business prospects are easier in 
other market segments. When a proposal is accompanied by evidence of a sizable cash commitment or a 
readily securable asset offered up by the borrower, this is no doubt easier to bank on than a proposal where 
the borrower’s equity in the proposal is largely or entirely tied up in Ma-ori land—an asset that cannot be as 
readily put at stake as general land can be.
In spite of difficulties in attracting debt finance to develop under-utilised Ma-ori land, development of 
commercial enterprises on this land remains a goal for many groups of landowners. Where people are 
conscious of the way in which capital was dissipated from the historical land-selling process that saw 
most of New Zealand transferred to non-Ma-ori ownership, there is greater appreciation of a need to act 
strategically to fund the development of remaining land, ensure people are equipped with the skills to 
manage development projects on that land and, most importantly, obtain the confidence of lenders who will 
support those projects. In this context it is completely understandable if Ma-ori landowners are conservative 
in business proposals involving their tribal land. After all, this land’s fundamental importance is usually not 
measured in financial terms to its owners. It also seems obvious that Ma-ori landowners will want to retain as 
much control as possible over their development projects whilst accepting that all borrowing involves giving 
up some control in order to assure the lender that interest owed can be paid and the principal secured. 
Given the circumstances faced by Indigenous communities in Australia to achieve recognition of rights to 
land and ownership of some land after colonisation it would be unsurprising if those communities similarly 
resisted losing control of the pace and approach to development of mainstream economic activity on that 
land base to outsiders.
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noteS
1. Ma-ori freehold land has had its beneficial ownership determined by the Ma-ori Land Court by freehold order.
2. Ma-ori incorporations are a particular statutory corporate vehicle for holding Ma-ori freehold land. They have 
been available since 1897.
3. General land owned by Ma-ori can also be brought within the application of the 1993 Act for a number of 
purposes. General land owned by Ma-ori is land that is owned for a beneficial estate in fee simple by a Ma-ori or 
by a group of persons of whom a majority are Ma-ori.
4. See Barcham (2004) for a discussion of policy influences on Ma-ori mobility and urbanisation after World War 
Two in particular. Bedford & Pool (2004) also discuss the same mobility issues.
5. For example, see s.22 of the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995 (the 1993 Act does not apply to land 
vested in the settlement entity). 
6. For example, see s.256 Te Ture Whenua Ma-ori/Ma-ori Land Act 1993 which sets out processes by which a Ma-ori 
incorporation may acquire and dispose of investment land separate from its core land and how such investment 
land can be held as general rather than Ma-ori freehold land.
7. In this paper the term tribe is used generally to refer to Ma-ori communities connected by kinship and acting for 
a common purpose. It is intended to refer to interests wider than the extended family (wha-nau) that in the Ma-ori 
language would be described as held by hapu- and by iwi groupings depending on the context and facts.
8. Compared to the arid zone in Australia, however, there is greater scope in New Zealand to use comparatively 
poorer classes of land for forestry, pastoral farming and some arable farming activities. Mountain sides and other 
steep slopes can be a practical constraint on land use in New Zealand.
9. A prerequisite to registering transactions affecting that land are the deposit of plans, following survey, that 
can be deposited in New Zealand’s land transfer and registration system. The absence of survey is a preliminary 
hurdle to entering transactions in many circumstances. See also New Zealand Law Commission (2001) for 
background statistics on Ma-ori land utilisation. Robertson (2005) has listed a number of practical impediments 
to harmonising the Ma-ori Land system and Land Transfer system records, and goes so far as to suggest the 
current priority of registering Ma-ori land titles is misdirected because of alienation restrictions on that land.
10. The Ma-ori Land Registration Project is an initiative of the Ma-ori Land Court and Land Information New Zealand. 
An outline of the project is available at  
<www.justice.govt.nz/maorilandcourt/registration-project.htm> (accessed 26 August 2006).
11.  Kingi (2004: 7) says this includes 135,400ha administered by the statutory Ma-ori Trustee. It will also include 
small family-owned parcels of land.
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12.  Interests in Ma-ori land might be divided or undivided: the latter being an equal share along with the other 
named owners. The former being a quantified shareholding out of a total number of interests. This was a 
different matter from those interests being undefined in the sense of there being no legal certainty about where 
within the land block a person’s share was located. Rather, each owner held their interest over the whole land 
block. (e.g. a purchaser of three out of nine equal interests in a land block might decide not to purchase any 
further interests. In order to define exactly what land they had purchased, and separate it from their Ma-ori 
co-owners, the purchaser would typically apply to the Ma-ori Land Court to partition out their purchased 
interests). This would set up a contest between the group of owners as a whole as to where the purchaser’s 
interests should be physically located on the land block. Things such as topography and access to roads would 
influence such contests. There were obviously also costs involved in partitioning land including survey, fencing 
and court costs.
13. Until 1909 the ability to mortgage Ma-ori freehold land was generally tightly controlled by the state irrespective 
of the practical availability of private development finance secured by mortgage. It was permitted for Ma-ori 
freehold land from 1865 until 1878 but prohibited altogether from 1878 to 1888. From 1888 until 1894 ability 
to mortgage this land was reinstated but then from 1894 until 1909 this was more tightly controlled. An 
1897 initiative permitted the mortgaging of land if it was first vested in a competent trustee. This initiative 
permitted owners of multiply-owned land to borrow from government departments (Native Land Laws 
Amendment Act 1897). From 1909 onwards, the ability of Ma-ori to borrow was increased. Under the Native 
Land Act 1909 mortgages of Ma-ori freehold land required confirmation by the relevant Ma-ori Land Board. 
Mortgages to recipients other than the State Loan Department required the consent of the Governor in Council. 
Ma-ori Incorporations had power to borrow from the State Loan Department with the consent of the Governor 
in Council. This increased ability to mortgage land in return for loans built on a growing acknowledgment that, 
in many areas, Ma-ori were no longer primarily going to be sellers of land. This is not to suggest land sales were 
no longer going to occur. Rather, development of Ma-ori farming enterprises, assisted to some extent by the 
machinery of state-institutions, was now a policy goal where it had previously not been.
14. See Hill (2004) for information on Ma-ori Land Boards and the Waitangi Tribunal (2004b) for an account of a 
rescue scheme involving the East Coast Trust and the East Coast Commissioner.
15.  The term alienation in the 1993 Act, however, does not include: dispositions by will of Ma_ori land or an interest 
in Ma-ori land; dispositions effected by Ma-ori Land Court order; the surrender of leases and licences over Ma-ori 
land; leases or licences (including variations and transfers), or contracts and arrangements to grant a lease or 
licence, granted for not more than 3 years in total; sale of Ma-ori land by a mortgagee under a power expressed 
or implied in an instrument of mortgage.
16. The same situation applies to a mortgage obligation still in place when an owner dies. The restrictive regime 
controlling the extent to which Ma-ori land can be applied to pay debts owed by an estate does not apply to 
mortgages (s.104(7)).
17. Sections 147 and 150C. Sales for minor boundary adjustments are exempted from the restrictions if the Court is 
satisfied the adjustments are necessary (ss150A(2) and 150C(2)).
18. For Ma-ori freehold land vested in a trustee, a person with a beneficial interest in the land can alienate that 
interest in the same way as if they held the legal interest (s.149).
19. A long-term lease is defined in the 1993 Act as one for a term of more than 52 years including renewals (s.4).
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20. As for other owners, sales to effect minor boundary adjustments may be excepted from this regime (s.150B(2)).
21. Tikanga Ma-ori are Ma-ori customary values and practices. A wha-naunga is a relative. A hapu- is a kin group 
comprising a number of associated extended families—wha-nau. Relations with customary connections to the 
land are within the class rather than merely any relation of the alienor. The sub-class of co-owners of the land 
excludes outsiders who have purchased interests and is restricted to the hapű kin group associated with the 
land.
22. 1993 Act, Part 8—duties and powers of the Ma-ori Land Court in relation to alienations of Ma-ori freehold land. 
Since amendments to the 1993 Act in 2002, alienations are now more straightforward once the set thresholds 
described above are met. A number of elements of judgement previously underpinning the Court’s evaluation of 
alienations have been largely removed. For example see repealed ss153-154.
23. For sole owners, joint tenants and owners in common these lesser alienations are leases, licences, forestry rights, 
profits, mortgages, charges or encumbrances (s.150C(3)). For incorporations and trustee owners these lesser 
alienations which require noting by the Registrar of the Court are leases, licences and forestry rights granted for 
terms of more than 21 years (including renewals) and all mortgages (ss150A(3)(b) and 150B(3)(b)).
24. Section 148. An example of an undivided interest would be where a group of 16 people own a piece of land 
in common equally. If one of their number sold his or her interest to an outsider that person would acquire 
an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the land. In a number of instances single undivided interests were 
accumulated by outside purchasers (Crown or private buyers) without reference to the remaining community of 
owners and where those outside purchasers later applied to partition out the interests they had acquired.
25. Adequacy must be judged by having regard to any relationship between the parties as well as any special 
circumstances. Every confirmation application must be supported by a special valuation by a registered valuer 
paid for by the applicant. The Court must have regard to the valuation but is not bound by it in determining the 
adequacy of the transaction (ss152(1)(d) and 158).
26. On attaining confirmation the transaction takes effect from the date it would have taken effect if alienation was 
not required subject to any requirements to register transactions under the Land Transfer Act 1952 (s.156(2)).
27. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc (2003) emphasises that problems in accessing finance could 
be (rather than are) an important obstacle to realising Ma-ori development aspirations because there is no 
ready way to evaluate the size of the problem. The research tends to be case-study based (as this paper is) so 
representativeness is difficult to judge. There is also no comparative data on the ease or difficulty of non-Ma-ori 
access to finance (2003: 82). This information—including success rates for applications for finance—is simply 
not available to researchers, hence the focus on case studies.
28. June McCabe (Westpac Bank) speaking to interviewer Dale Husband on Radio New Zealand Mana News, 3 March 
2005. Ms McCabe acknowledged that Ma-ori multiply-owned land was generally not good enough security for 
a lender, so the lender had to find alternative ways to look at transactions. In her view such a shift would lead 
to a focus on the merits of the business proposal over and above the security available: ‘That’s not easy because 
people choose to do deals that are immediately available. That’s what happens in a big bank when you say well, 
this is an easier deal and Ma-ori deals are harder deals.’ Ms McCabe was advocating that financial institutions and 
government think afresh about opportunities for banks to finance the development of Ma-ori land by working 
collaboratively with Ma-ori. Specifically, she advocated renewed examination of banking products that can work 
with co-operative structures.
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29. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc (2003: 83) stresses that on a like for like basis it is difficult to 
determine whether Ma-ori have distinctive problems in accessing finance compared to other similar non-Ma-ori 
businesses. In his presentation to the 2005 Hui Taumata (Ma-ori economic summit) the economist Adrian Orr 
suggested Ma-ori businesses are bankable when their management is respected, their boards are credible, and 
their use of the underlying assets can demonstrate good cash flow. For ‘greenfields’ projects direct equity will 
be expected (Orr 2005).
30. See Reeves (2005a) and Hui Taumata Day Two Summary of Panel on Capital facilitated by Peter Douglas, 
especially contributions by Adrian Orr and Fred Cookson.
31. The destination of the final $150,000 is not apparent from the reported judgments.
32. See <http://www.bridgecorp.co.nz/> [accessed 16 July 2005].
33. The High Court of New Zealand is the originating court of general jurisdiction for civil litigation. Appeals from 
its decisions are to the Court of Appeal. Appeals from the Court of Appeal are to the Supreme Court via a leave 
to appeal procedure.
34. Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors of Matauri X Incorporation [2004] 2 NZLR 792 Fisher J at paragraphs 3 and 
62–77.
35. Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors of Matauri X Inc [2005] 3 NZLR 193 (CA).
36. The three issues requiring further argument are: the effect of statutory codification of the indoor management 
rule in Te Ture Whenua Ma-ori (s.271); the effect of registering the mortgage under the land transfer system; 
and, a cause of action raised by Bridgecorp about the legal effect of Matauri X Incorporation taking the money 
advanced (money had and received).
37. The Court of Appeal pointed out they did not regard this failure as the judge’s fault since counsel appearing in 
the High Court had not referred Fisher J to this amending law.
38. Bridgecorp Finance Ltd v Proprietors of Matauri X Incorporated [2005] NZSC 31 (2 June 2005).
39. <http://www.courts.govt.nz/supremecourt/currenthearings.html> (accessed 6 July 2005).
40. The judgments of the High Court describe a proposal to create unit titles from the main leasehold interest. It 
is not clear from subsequent publicity material whether this is still intended. This paper refers to sub-leases 
accordingly.
41. Proprietors of Hiruharama Ponui Block Inc v Attorney General [2003] 2 NZLR 478 and Proprietors of Hiruharama 
Ponui Block Inc v Attorney General (No 2) [2004] 1 NZLR 394.
42. It might be notable that in both case studies the first instance statutory interpretation was corrected on further 
examination. This might indicate both that the legal issues were not thoroughly argued by participants as well 
as the continuing complexity of the Ma-ori land law system. Both cases involved assessment of the legal effect 
of amendments to the 1993 Act on the transactions at issue.
43. Appeal 2006/2 (Application A20060011115) by M Te A Bramley against the decision of Deputy Chief Judge Isaac 
of the Ma-ori Land Court made on 13 February 2006 (83 Taupo- Minute Book 81–130).
44. Symphony Properties Limited (2005) Parawera, see also <http://www.parawera.co.nz> (accessed 26 August 
2006).
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45. An issue left unresolved by the Matauri X litigation not being pursued further is the effectiveness of the provisions 
of the 1993 Act that state a person doing business with a Ma-ori Incorporation need not assure themselves of 
the propriety of the internal steps taken by the Incorporation to enter an agreement. It is hard to imagine any 
circumstances in which this codification of the indoor management rule would not be effective to protect a 
lender.
46. Robertson (2005) regards the Court as a cumbersome process in need of reform that could see administrative 
power exercised in place of current judicial powers.
47. Perpetual leasing of Ma-ori reserved land under statutory schemes is an example that has received attention in 
New Zealand. For a discussion see Waitangi Tribunal (2003a) at chapter 16. A further example is joint venture 
forestry where Ma-ori landowners contributed land and other parties contributed money and expertise. One such 
scheme has been reported on by the Waitangi Tribunal in its Tarawera Forest Report (2003b).
48. This is in contrast with ongoing state support for loans for housing on multiply-owned Ma-ori land in order 
to counter reluctance by private financial institutions to lend in this area. The approach taken by the state-
controlled Housing New Zealand Corporation Ltd to loan money for housing is outlined in Altman, Linkhorn and 
Clarke (2005).
49. See, for example, the information provided by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission to the Reeves 
review of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) set out in Appendix V of the review 
report addressing commercial use of freehold [Aboriginal] land (Reeves 1998).
50. A ‘Wai’ is a Waitangi Tribunal claim number.
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